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Abstract: In this essay I argue against rule-deductivism. Rule-deductivism is the view that the 
justification of law-applying decisions is adequately understood on the model of a deductive 
argument—a “legal syllogism”, as it is often called—with a statement of an applicable rule as the 
“major premise” and a statement of the relevant facts as the “minor” one. Rule-deductivism—not to 
be confused with formalism—has long been a popular view in legal argumentation theory. Endorsed 
by Kelsen, Hart, MacCormick, and Alexy, it continues to be accepted by authors such as Gardner, 
Leiter, and Marmor, among many others. This paper begins by offering a characterization of rule-
deductivism; goes on to argue that rule-deductivism is not, even in its stronger version, a view that 
should be accepted; and concludes by sketching and motivating a new model of the justification of 





My goal in this chapter is to argue against one popular idea about the role of legal rules in 
legal argument: that the justification of law-applying decisions is adequately understood on 
the model of a deductive argument—a “legal syllogism,” as it is often called—having as its 
“major premise” a statement of an applicable legal rule, and as a “minor premise” a statement 
of the relevant facts. 
Before you object that this is a naïve, old-fashioned idea that nobody endorses anymore, 
let me be clear that my target is not what Brian Leiter has labelled “vulgar formalism”. 
Vulgar formalism is the view that “judicial decision-making involves nothing more than 
mechanical deduction on the model of the syllogism”.1 This is not, as Leiter points out, “a 
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view to which anyone today cares to subscribe”.2 Maybe no one ever really did. But Leiter 
goes on to say this: 
 
It is true enough that deductive reasoning on the model of syllogism is a characteristic feature of most 
well-done judicial opinions—that is, the conclusion can be reconstructed as following deductively from a 
statement of the applicable rule of law and the statement of the facts.3 
 
True enough? I don’t think it is true at all. Unlike vulgar formalism, however, the view 
expressed in this passage is one that many authors do adopt. Some, like Leiter, seem to take it 
for granted. Here is Andrei Marmor, in a piece in which he proposes to “explore some 
structural aspects of legal syllogism”: 
 
It is . . . the regular business of lawyers and judges to draw legal inferences. Many of those inferences look 
like an ordinary syllogism whereby a conclusion is derived from some premises about the normative 
content of the law and statements describing facts or events.4 
 
Another recent endorsement comes from John Gardner: 
 
In a legal argument, an existing legal norm is a major premise, and a new legal norm is the conclusion. The 
legal arguments in everyday . . . examples [i.e. those in which a court makes its ruling by applying existing 
legal rules to the case in hand] are, of course, very simple. They go something like this: 
 
Tortfeasors are liable to pay full reparative damages to those whom they tortuously injure; 
Jones tortuously injured Smith to the tune of $50; 
  therefore, Jones is liable to pay Smith $50 in reparative damages.5 
 
Many other prominent authors have subscribed to this picture—with only minor variations—
over the past decades. Kelsen appears to have been one, at least in the second edition of the 
Pure Theory of Law.6 Hart was certainly another.7 And Neil MacCormick and Robert Alexy 
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stand out among those who have offered full defences of the view that, in the words of the 
former, 
 
the legal reasoning advanced to justify legal claims or legal decisions can sometimes be entirely, and must 
always be in part, deductive in its essence. The thesis [is] that legal rules are properly conceptualized as 
hypothetical in form, prescribing that if certain circumstances (certain “operative facts”) obtain, then 
certain normative consequences are to follow. Rules being so conceptualised, one who can establish in a 
given case that an instance of the relevant operative facts obtains can justifiably claim that the relevant 
normative consequence ought to follow, or indeed in the capacity of a judge can justifiably decide that it 
does follow, and can justifiably give a legal decision giving effect to that consequence. This is a form of 
deductive inference, or, if you like, deductive/subsumptive reasoning: you postulate a general hypothetical 
rule, you establish facts in a particular case subsumable within the rule’s hypothesis, and you draw the 
logical conclusion for the particular case from rule plus facts.8 
 
This is the view I mean to reject. Some of its proponents call it “deductivism”,9 but I will 
refer to it instead as “rule-deductivism”, and to its defenders as “rule-deductivists”. For my 
quarrel is not, as I will explain, with the claim per se that the justification of law-applying 
judicial decisions can be understood as a deductive inference. My quarrel is with what rule-
deductivists believe the inference should look like, and particularly with the role they think 
should be assigned to legal rules. 
I speak of the rule-deductivist view, but in fact it is far from clear what exactly the claim 
is—or the claims are—that these authors endorse. Their own formulations are not always 
transparent, and there is in the literature no received account of rule-deductivism. So I will 
begin, in Section 2, by trying to assemble a sharper picture of what rule-deductivists hold. 
This will call for some charitable reconstruction: one thesis many rule-deductivists say they 
hold is plainly indefensible on logical grounds, as we will see in Section 3; but there is a 
stronger claim we can spell out on their behalf. I then go on to argue, in Section 4, that rule-
deductivism, even in its stronger version, is not a view we should accept. 
This chapter is therefore primarily critical rather than constructive; though meant to 
stand on its own, it is also the first part of a broader project. But I will conclude by briefly 
sketching and motivating, in Section 5, a new model of the justification of law-applying 
decisions—one capable of overcoming the flaws of the model of the legal syllogism. 
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2.1. The “Legal Syllogism” 
 
We need to piece together an account of rule-deductivism, and the just-quoted passage by 
MacCormick is a good place to start. One point he makes is that “legal rules are properly 
conceptualised as hypothetical in form, prescribing that if certain circumstances (certain 
‘operative facts’) obtain, then certain normative consequences are to follow.”10 This is a 
fairly orthodox claim. It is also integral to rule-deductivism. Consider the following 
example—from a relatively well-known essay by A. G. Guest—meant to illustrate “deductive 
reasoning . . . in the sense of the application of a general [legal] rule to a particular instance”: 
 
Let us take the words of a penal statute, in this case the Representation of People Act, 1949, s. 52: “Any 
person shall be guilty of an offence if, at a parliamentary or local government election, he fraudulently 
takes out of the polling station any ballot paper.” Here the legal process consists in the application of a 
fixed and ascertained rule to the facts of a particular case. The section of the statute constitutes the major 
premiss, the minor being “X (the accused) at a parliamentary or local government election fraudulently 
took out of a polling station a ballot paper.” This, it will be seen, comprises the words of the indictment. If 
the minor premiss is true, the offence is made out and X will be found guilty.11 
 
At first sight this looks straightforward. Guest’s point is not really, of course, that the accused 
will be found guilty. He does not mean that the conclusion of the inference is a prediction. 
Rather, as he goes on to explain, he takes the conclusion to be a “normative” statement that 
the accused ought to be found guilty.12 So the inference Guest describes combines, as 
premises, two statements of different kinds. One is meant to be a statement of a statutory rule, 
its form presumably to be rendered along the following lines: 
 
For every x: if x at a parliamentary or local government election takes out of a polling 
station a ballot paper, then x ought to be found guilty of an offence.13 
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Note also that Guest refers to the relevant rule as one that is “fixed and ascertained”: it is 
fixed and ascertained by reference to the words of the statute. (Guest does not take much care 
to distinguish the rule from the “section of the statute”.) That is not meant to prevent the 
restatement of the rule in formally clearer terms, as in the formulation above. But the 
example is one in which the rule being applied is the legislated rule; and the application of 
legislated rules, as we will also see, is something that many rule-deductivists claim to be 
particularly well placed to explain. 
 The other premise in Guest’s example is a statement about the facts of some particular 
case. So the full inference can be displayed as follows: 
 
(1)  For every x: if x at a parliamentary or local government election takes out of a 
polling station a ballot paper, then x ought to be found guilty of an offence. 
(2) The accused at a parliamentary or local government election took out of a polling 
station a ballot paper. 
Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) The accused ought to be found guilty of an offence. 
 
This inference, an example of what is normally called a “legal syllogism”, is an instance of 
the following valid form: 
 
 (1) For every x: if x is F, then x ought to be G. 
 (2) a is F. 
 Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
 (3) a ought to be G.14 
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The so-called “legal syllogism”, then, is a deductively valid inference in which one premise 
(the “major premise”) is a general statement of law, another premise (the “minor” one) a 
particular statement of fact, and the conclusion a particular statement of law.15 
 
2.2. A Model 
 
Rule-deductivists claim that the legal syllogism is a model of the justification of law-applying 
judicial decisions. This claim, though, needs some unpacking. 
 Let us start by introducing a distinction between two senses in which we can speak of the 
“justification” of a judicial decision. In one sense, to say that a judicial decision is justified—
legally justified—is to say that it is correct according to law: it is to say that the court ought 
legally to have issued it, or at least that it is not the case that the court ought not legally to 
have issued it. Courts, however, are normally required to do more than simply issue decisions 
that are justified in this “objective” sense (as we may call it). Courts are normally required to 
justify their decisions: required, or at any rate expected, to give reasons—to offer 
arguments—showing that their decisions are indeed justified in that first, objective sense. 
 So there are two things we can ask of any given judicial decision. We can ask whether 
the decision is (or was) justified, issued according to law. And we can ask whether the court 
justified it, and if so whether the justification it offered was a good one—whether the 
decision was well justified by the court. 
 It is this second sense of “justification” that rule-deductivists have in mind when they 
speak of the legal syllogism as a model of the justification of law-applying decisions. They 
are concerned with justification in the sense of reason-giving—with “legal reasoning . . . 
purport[ing] to show that a decision (or a claim) is justifiable according to the law in force”.16 
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 The thought is not, of course, that judges either do or should actually present their 
arguments in the shape of a syllogism. Rule-deductivists do not hold “that it is necessary or 
even best to set out real legal arguments in rigorously syllogistic form”.17 What they hold is 
that if a law-applying judicial decision is well justified by the court—if, as Leiter puts it, the 
opinion is “well-done”18—then the court’s argument can be reconstructed on the model of 
the syllogism. What does “well justified” mean? It cannot mean that the decision is justified 
in the objective sense—that is, actually correct according to law. To say that a law-applying 
decision is well justified is to say the argument given by the court is an argument of the right 
kind: an argument (a) aimed at showing that the decision is indeed legally correct; (b) whose 
premises are appropriately related, logically speaking, to the conclusion; and (c) which, if 
sound—if it has no false premises—succeeds in showing the decision to be legally correct. 
And what does it mean to say that such an argument can be reconstructed on the model of the 
syllogism? It means that the argument the court is in fact giving—however informal and 
enthymematic its presentation in the text of the opinion—can be fully brought out and fairly 
represented as an instance of that pattern.19 
 Now, rule-deductivists do not think that the legal syllogism exhausts the range of types 
of argument that courts could and normally do give in support of their decisions. There are 
many examples of well-made judicial decisions whose supporting arguments are not to be 
understood as legal syllogisms; rule-deductivists are concerned only with a certain class of 
judicial decisions. What class is that? Rule-deductivists are often unclear on that point. We 
need, however, to identify the relevant class—the class of the decisions that rule-deductivists 
take as their object of theorisation—if we are to be able to assess their claim that the legal 
syllogism is an adequate model of the arguments made by courts in decisions of that class. I 
have been using the phrase “law-applying judicial decisions” to refer to the relevant class. 
What I mean—what I take rule-deductivists to have in mind—is the class of decisions 
justified on the basis of existing law that applies to the case in hand. This is not yet a fully 
transparent description, but it is enough to get us started. 
 I will argue in Section 3 that rule-deductivism, thus understood, is manifestly wrong: that 
law-applying judicial decisions are not aptly understood on the model of the legal syllogism. 
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But let me first go over three disclaimers standardly offered by rule-deductivists in 
clarification of their views. 
 
2.3. Discovery and Justification 
 
The first disclaimer is that the model of the syllogism does not purport to reflect the way by 
which courts reach their decisions. The point is often stressed—since Richard Wasserstrom 
first cast it in these terms in the early 1960s—by appealing to a traditional distinction from 
the philosophy of science: rule-deductivists are concerned with the structure of justification, 
not with the process of discovery.20 Here, for example, is Hart’s gloss on this difference 
between “methods of discovery and standards of appraisal” and on its bearing on rule-
deductivism: 
 
[I]t is important to distinguish (1) assertions made concerning the usual processes or habits of thought by 
which judges actually reach their decisions . . . and (3) the standards by which judicial decisions are to be 
appraised. The first of these concerns matters of descriptive psychology, and to the extent that assertions in 
this field go beyond the descriptions of examined instances, they are empirical generalizations or laws of 
psychology; . . . the third relates to the assessment or justification of decisions. 
 These distinctions are important because it has sometimes been argued that since judges frequently 
arrive at decisions without going through any process of calculation or inference in which legal rules or 
precedents figure, the claim that deduction from legal rules plays any part in decision is mistaken. This 
argument is confused, for in general the issue is not one regarding the manner in which judges do, or 
should, come to their decisions; rather, it concerns the standards they respect in justifying decisions, 
however reached.21 
 
2.4. Internal and External Justification 
 
A second proviso is that the legal syllogism is not meant to be a complete model of the 
justification of law-applying judicial decisions. Recall how MacCormick presents his view: 
“legal reasoning advanced to justify legal claims or legal decisions”, he says, “can sometimes 
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be entirely, and must always be in part, deductive in its essence.”22 The point, then, is that the 
justification of law-applying judicial decisions is at least partly a matter of deduction from 
legal statements combined with statements of fact. 
When is legal justification wholly “deductive in its essence”? When neither the 
identification of the applicable rule, nor the presence of the relevant facts, nor the 
classification of the particular case as one to which the rule applies, is problematic or 
controversial. In such “easy cases”, writes David Lyons, 
 
the law is clear enough so that [the case] can be decided in a more or less “mechanical” way, by applying 
relevant rules in a logically rigorous argument. A proposition of law that decides the case is then derivable 
by logically deductive methodology from a combination of rules of law and statements of facts about the 
case. The simplest model for such an argument may be termed a legal syllogism, which includes as its 
major premise a single rule of law, as its minor premise a statement of relevant facts, and as its conclusion 
the dispositive proposition of law.23 
 
But rule-deductivists do not think that all cases are “easy”. If there are doubts around either 
the identification of the applicable rule, or the description and classification of the relevant 
facts, or both, then, they grant, “subsumption and the drawing of a syllogistic conclusion no 
longer characterise the nerve of the reasoning.”24 The judge will need to offer further reasons 
to justify her views on what the law or the facts are; and this aspect of the justification of 
judicial decisions need not be, as far as rule-deductivists are concerned, “purely deductive 
and logical in character”.25 That is not to say, though, that the model of the legal syllogism 
does not capture an important aspect of the justification of the decision: it captures, rule-
deductivists say, the (logically) last link, as it were, in the relevant argumentative chain. 
 This point is also often put in terms of a distinction, introduced by Jerzy Wróblewski, 
between the internal and the external justification of judicial decisions.26 Internal justification 
concerns the logical validity of the inference from the relevant premises—the statement of 
the applicable legal rule, and the statement of the relevant facts—to the final conclusion. 
External justification concerns the truth of each of these premises, and therefore the 
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soundness of the inference. What the legal syllogism purports to model, as Wróblewski and 
others point out, is the internal justification of law-applying decisions.27 So while it may 
often be true that “[t]he Judge does not and cannot reach his decision solely by applying 
transformation rules to a conjunction of a statement of the legal rule invoked by the parties 
and a statement of the facts”, it remains the case, rule-deductivists say, that once the judge 
“has decided whether the legal rule includes or excludes the present case . . . his reasoning 
[can] take a syllogistic form.”28 
 
2.5. Questions of Law and Questions of Fact 
 
A final, closely related caveat concerns a distinction upon which the very idea of the legal 
syllogism seems to be predicated: that between questions of law and questions of fact. The 
caveat is that rule-deductivism is not wedded to the view that there is a strong divide between 
these two kinds of questions.  
 Consider the familiar point that “almost every rule can prove to be ambiguous or unclear 
in relation to some disputed or disputable context of litigation.”29 Faced with a case whose 
classification under the terms of the rule is doubtful, what must a judge establish? Not merely 
whether certain events took place, but whether they count as instances of the relevant legal 
predicates. That, though, is no longer a mere question of fact; as Hart puts it: 
 
What looks like a pure question of fact: Did he sign the document? Did they rescue a vessel? turns out in 
such cases (not in all cases) to be the hybrid question: Is what was done to count as signing a document, 
rescuing a vessel, for the purpose of this rule?30 
 
The rule-deductivist account does not depend on there being a clear-cut distinction between 
questions of law and questions of fact. For one, the term “fact” is equivocal, and the rule-
deductivist’s claim is not that the minor premise of the legal syllogism must always be a 
description of empirical facts; there is after all no reason to think that the antecedent of the 
applicable rule will itself include only descriptions of empirical facts. Second, and more to 
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28 Hart (1955: 260, emphasis in the original). 
29 MacCormick (1978: 65-66, footnote—to Hart’s The Concept of Law—omitted). 




the point, rule-deductivists need not deny that the external justification of the minor premise 
may have to involve normative judgments about whether the facts of the case in hand do 
count as instances of the relevant general terms “for the purpose” of the rule. For that, again, 
is a matter of what goes into deciding to adopt a certain premise, rather than a matter of how 
one’s premises, once adopted, must relate logically if the court’s decision is to be justified. 
 It is true that some authors suggest that the scheme of the legal syllogism be expanded to 
reflect this point about the legal classification of the facts of the case. Andrei Marmor, for 
example, proposes that we make room for two “factual” premises rather than just one: one 
premise describing “something that happened in the world”, another asserting that such facts 
count as instances of the general terms featured in the antecedent of the rule.31 Chaïm 
Perelman had once advanced a similar view.32 And Robert Alexy points out that we could 
supplement the simpler scheme of the syllogism with as many steps as needed to address any 
potentially controversial classificatory issue: 
 
 (1) For every x: if x is F, then x ought to be G. 
 (2) For every x: if x is M1, then x is F. 
 (3) For every x: if x is M2, then x is M1. 
 . . . 
 (4) For every x: if x is H, then x is Mn. 
 (5) a is H. 
 Therefore (from (1) to (5)), 
 (6) a ought to be G.33 
  
Premise (1) would be the formulation of the applicable legal rule (for example, a rule as 
“stated” in some valid statutory provision34). As to premises (2) to (4), Alexy remarks, they 
are not necessarily derived from any positive legal rules; but they are also not descriptions of 
empirical facts. Rather, they can be understood as statements of whatever rules underlie the 
court’s decision to classify the facts of the case in hand under the relevant legal predicates. 
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Premises (2) to (4) “bridge the gap”, as it were, between the statement of the legal rule in (1), 
and the factual description in (5).35  
 But of course, as Alexy also notes,36 (2), (3), (4) and (5) together entail 
 
 (5') a is F, 
 
which together with (1) entails (6). So we might just as well say that we have here one simple 
syllogism with (1) as the major premise and (5') as the minor one; and that the role of 
statements (2) to (5) is that of providing external justification for (5'). Alternatively, but by 
the same token, given that (1), (2), (3), and (4) together entail 
 
 (5'') For every x: if x is H, then x ought to be G, 
 
we might say that what we have is a simple syllogism with (5'') and (5) as premises; and that 
premises (1) to (4) provide external justification for (5''). (Note, though, that in neither case 
can the full justification dispense with the statement, in (1), of the relevant “applicable 
norm”, as Alexy calls it.37 That is the statement that specifies the terms or predicates under 
which the facts of the case are to be classified.) And the same point holds with regard to 
Perelman’s and Marmor’s suggestions.38 A judge’s claim that the facts of the case satisfy the 
relevant legal predicates may be the product of a normative judgment; but rule-deductivists 
remain free to hold that once such a claim is adopted, the conclusion will follow logically 
under the basic scheme of the legal syllogism. 
 
2.6. In Summary 
 
With all these caveats and qualifications, is rule-deductivism starting to sound like a trivial 
thesis? Its endorsers would deny the charge. Rule-deductivism, they say, provides the best 
picture of what is involved in the requirement that judges—in accordance with their proper 
role—apply existing law to the case at hand. Here is how Torben Spaak puts the point: 
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The primary task of judges is to decide cases, not to expound the law. The natural starting-point, in 
keeping with the separation of powers, is that the judge has, in virtue of his office, a duty to judge in 
accordance with the law, that is, to apply existing law rather than create new law. Accordingly, deciding a 
case involves (i) finding and clarifying the law, (ii) determining the facts, and (iii) applying the law to the 
facts. 
 If we assume that law is a system of norms, we may view legal decision-making as a matter of applying 
legal norms to facts. On this analysis, deductive justification in the form of syllogistic reasoning will play 
an important role in legal reasoning.39 
 
The ideal of the separation of powers, of course, also loomed large behind Beccaria’s original 
mention of the syllogism as a model of the judicial application of the law: 
 
Nor can the authority to interpret the laws devolve upon the criminal judges, for the same reason that they 
are not legislators . . . The judge should construct a perfect syllogism about every criminal case: the major 
premise should be the general law; the minor, the conformity or otherwise of the action with the law; and 
the conclusion, freedom or punishment. Whenever the judge is forced, or takes it upon himself, to 
construct even as few as two syllogisms, then the door is opened to uncertainty.40 
 
Beccaria’s wording here is too strong, even slightly nonsensical. But we need not tie rule-
deductivism to so simplistic a view of the separation of powers. Some rule-deductivists do 
claim that legislated rules have a “single and uniquely authoritative [linguistic] 
formulation”41 to be found in the words of the statute; and that the legal syllogism is 
especially well-suited to represent the application of statutory rules.42 But one does not need 
to endorse these claims to agree, as all rule-deductivists do, that the model of the syllogism 
does aptly capture the justification of judicial decisions that apply legislated rules. 
 So there you have it. Rule-deductivists do not think that there is nothing more to legal 
reasoning or judicial decision-making than applying existing law to particular cases. They do 
not claim that the justification of every judicial decision issued in accordance with law stands 
to be represented on the model of the legal syllogism. Some cases, though, are indeed 
governed by existing legal rules; and rule-deductivists claim to have the best account of what 
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an argument for applying existing rules to particular cases involves. As again MacCormick 
puts it: 
 
when particular facts of particular cases do fit uncontroversially or after non-deductive resolution of 
controversy into the categories stipulated in universally quantified legal rules, then the universally 
prescribed legal consequence has particular application in the particular case. So if a judge ought to do 
justice according to law . . . he ought to implement that consequence here.43 
 
The court’s argument in such cases, in short, is, properly reconstructed, one in which a 
statement of the applicable rule features as a premise that “combined with [a description of] 
the facts of the case, suffices to yield the ruling”.44 Or so rule-deductivists say. 
 
 
3. RULE-DEDUCTIVISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF LAW-APPLYING 
DECISIONS 
 
What they say, though, is not convincing—certainly not if we take them at their word.45  
 Rule-deductivists often claim to be concerned with the application of rules to cases, and 
primarily with judicial decisions that apply rules to cases. Wróblewski, for example, refers to 
the judicial decision “as an application of a general legal norm (a statute) to the concrete facts 
of the case”, and to the legal syllogism as “a suitable way of justifying [the] judicial 
decision”.46 Hart is clear that what is at issue is “the reasoning involved in the application of 
legislative rules to particular cases”, and that it is “the court’s decision”—my emphases—that 
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is “represented as the conclusion of a syllogism”.47 Gardner says that the conclusion of the 
inference is a judicial ruling that applies the “existing legal norm” featured as the “major 
premise”.48 Bäcker speaks of the “syllogistic formalisation of rule-application”.49 And 
MacCormick goes as far as to claim that it is the framework of the legal syllogism that allows 
us to make sense of “what could possibly count as applying a statute at all.”50 
 But the legal syllogism cannot model this. Let us go back to the passage by A. G. Guest 
that I briefly discussed in Section 2: 
 
Let us take the words of a penal statute, in this case the Representation of People Act, 1949, s. 52: “Any 
person shall be guilty of an offence if, at a parliamentary or local government election, he fraudulently 
takes out of the polling station any ballot paper.” Here the legal process consists in the application of a 
fixed and ascertained rule to the facts of a particular case. The section of the statute constitutes the major 
premiss, the minor being “X (the accused) at a parliamentary or local government election fraudulently 
took out of a polling station a ballot paper.” This, it will be seen, comprises the words of the indictment. If 
the minor premiss is true, the offence is made out and X will be found guilty.51 
 
At first glance, I said, this seems straightforward. Not so much at second glance. Consider 
Guest’s last sentence. “If the minor premiss is true,” he says, “the offence is made out and X 
will be found guilty.” We already know we should substitute “X ought to be found guilty” for 
Guest’s “X will be found guilty.” But it is odd that Guest should state the conclusion of the 
inference the way he does. Take as premises of the relevant inference the two following 
statements, as Guest explicitly says we should: 
 
 (1)  Any person shall be guilty of an offence if, at a parliamentary or local 
government election, he fraudulently takes out of the polling station any ballot 
paper. 
 (2)   X (the accused) at a parliamentary or local government election fraudulently took 
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What follows from the conjunction of (1) and (2) is that: 
 
 (3)   X shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
This claim, however, is importantly different from what Guest says the conclusion should be: 
 
 (3*)  The offence is made out and X ought to be found guilty [of an offence]. 
 
This claim—the claim in (3*)—is a conjunction; and the second conjunct bears no relation to 
the rest of the inference. The claim in (3), that X shall be guilty of an offence, is not the same 
as the claim that X ought to (or shall—it makes no difference) be found guilty of an offence, 
which is what we find in (3*). (As to the first conjunct—the claim that “the offence is made 
out”—it is also unclear that it does follow from (1) and (2). To say that the offence is made 
out is to say that X committed—is guilty of—the offence; and that is not obviously the same 
as saying that X shall be guilty of the offence. But let that pass.) Where then could this 
reference—to X’s being found guilty of an offence—have come from? 
 The answer is not hard to find. Guest, too, is explicitly concerned with the application of 
statutory rules: concerned, in his own words, with “deductive reasoning . . . in the sense of 
the application of a general rule to a particular instance”.52 So that—the application of the 
relevant rule—is what the inference is aimed at justifying. But then we must keep in mind 
something that Guest manifestly overlooks: that the application of a legal rule is an action; it 
is something that someone—paradigmatically a judge or court—does.53 What action? That 
will vary from case to case. In Guest’s example, the relevant action would be the court’s 
finding the accused guilty (and indeed proceeding to convict him) of the relevant offence. 
That is the action that counts as applying the statutory rule to the case in hand. It is, therefore, 
what stands to be justified by the inference. That is why Guest’s conclusion, the claim in 
(3*), plausibly mentions X’s being found guilty. 
 What Guest misses is that if his inference is to provide justification for the court’s 
finding the accused guilty, then the conclusion would have to be something like this—a claim 
that the relevant action is one that the court ought to perform: 
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 (3')  Court C ought to find the accused guilty of an offence. 
 
This is the sort of claim that has to be argued for if one wants to justify one’s application of 
the provision to the facts in an example such as Guest’s. But that means that (3') is also the 
kind of claim that would have to feature as the consequent of the relevant “major premise”: 
otherwise the inference won’t run. The major premise, then, would have to read, not as (1), 
but as follows: 
 
 (1')   Court C ought to find guilty of an offence any person who at a parliamentary or 
local government election fraudulently takes out of the polling station any ballot 
paper. 
 
The problem is that this can no longer serve as a statement of the relevant rule—the statutory 
rule that the court is supposed to be applying. Why not? Remember that Guest is clear that it 
is “the section of the statute” (or in any case the corresponding “fixed and ascertained” rule) 
that features as the major premise of the inference. But while the formulation in (1)—Guest’s 
own statement of the major premise—is not, at least prima facie, an implausible way of 
stating the content of the relevant rule, the claim in (1') is neither equivalent to, nor entailed 
by, the claim in (1); and does not plausibly stand as a statement of any rule that that provision 
could be taken to express. 
It is normally the case, of course, that courts have a duty to—under certain conditions—
find guilty, and convict, and sentence, criminal wrongdoers. And it seems sensible to say, as 
Guest does at one point, that “in the example cited, upon proof that the accused took out of 
the polling station a ballot paper, the courts are commanded to apply certain sanctions to the 
wrongdoer”.54 That is not what I am denying. My point is simply that this is something that 
does not follow from the statement of the rule that the court is supposed to be applying. The 
action that counts as applying the rule to the case cannot be found in, or derived from, any 
statement of the applicable rule itself. The legal syllogism, therefore, cannot model the 
justification of any such action. 
 It is purely for the sake of convenience that I have been focusing on the passage by 
Guest; the error I have just tried to bring out is far from being specifically his. Take the 
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passage by Neil MacCormick that I quoted in Section 1. It included the following two 
sentences: 
 
Rules being so conceptualised [as hypothetical in form], one who can establish in a given case that an 
instance of the relevant operative facts obtains can justifiably claim that the relevant normative 
consequence ought to follow, or indeed in the capacity of a judge can justifiably decide that it does follow, 
and can justifiably give a legal decision giving effect to that consequence. This is a form of deductive 
inference . . .: you postulate a general hypothetical rule, you establish facts in a particular case subsumable 
within the rule’s hypothesis, and you draw the logical conclusion for the particular case from rule plus 
facts.55 
 
But this is wrong on two counts. First, given a statement of some relevant rule, what someone 
who establishes an instance of the relevant facts can justifiably claim is that the consequence 
does follow—it follows logically, if, as MacCormick claims, the reasoning is “deductive in 
essence”56—not that it ought to follow. Second, and more important, it certainly does not 
follow from those two premises that a judge can justifiably give effect to that consequence. 
Giving effect to the consequence is indeed one way of applying the relevant rule; but again it 
is not something that can be justified on the model of the syllogism.57 
 Or take John Gardner’s views on the matter; he makes the same mistake in a different 
way. Gardner says that a legal argument is “an argument about what to do (e.g. what ruling to 
make)” in which “at least some legal norms figure among the major premises”.58 He agrees, 
then, that a ruling—making a ruling—is an action; something a judge does. Gardner also says 
that “a legal ruling is a legally binding decision on the application of a legal rule to what 
lawyers call a ‘case’: to a situation-token rather than a situation-type”.59 To make a ruling is 
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therefore not merely to assert that the legal rule applies to the case. To make a ruling, 
Gardner says, is to exercise a normative power, and thereby to bring about changes in other 
people’s normative positions.60 
 But consider Gardner’s example of a “very simple two-premise legal argument that 
could be made by a judge”: 
 
Rule: Any person who calls another person a liar has a duty to pay $50 to that other person. 
 Fact: Barnewall (a person) called Adolphus (another person) a liar. 
 Ruling: Thus, Barnewall has a duty to pay $50 to Adolphus.61 
 
This is a valid inference. But its conclusion is not, pace Gardner, a ruling. The conclusion is 
simply a claim in law—a proposition of law. It is the proposition that Barnewall has a certain 
duty. It is true if the premises are both true. But propositions are not actions, and therefore 
they are not rulings. And while asserting a proposition (or making a claim) is, of course, an 
action, it is also not the sort of action that Gardner calls a ruling. Simply asserting something 
does not amount to the exercise of any power, and brings about no changes in anyone’s 
normative positions.  
 The main problem, though, is not that the ruling itself—being an action rather than a 
proposition (or a sentence)—does not follow logically from the conjunction of those (or any) 
premises. The main problem is again that the court’s ruling cannot be justified on the basis of 
what is asserted in Gardner’s premises. If indeed a legal argument is, as Gardner says, “an 
argument about what to do (e.g. what ruling to make)”, then the conclusion in his example 
would have to be something like the claim that the judge ought to rule that Barnewall has a 
duty to pay $50 to Adolphus—which is not something that those premises entail. 
 What, you may ask, turns on all this? Am I not making too much of a trivial point? 
Could rule-deductivists not simply reply that any legal syllogism may of course be coupled 
with a further premise of the relevant sort? Perhaps something like this (to keep to Gardner’s 
example): 
 
 (0)  If Barnewall has a duty to pay $50 to Adolphus, then the judge ought to rule that 
Barnewall has a duty to pay $50 to Adolphus.  
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The complex inference would then validly establish the relevant proposition—which, if true, 
would then justify the judge’s ruling. Would this not do? 
 No, it wouldn’t. For the challenge here is not to come up with an expansion of the 
syllogism that would yield a valid argument for the conclusion that the judge ought to rule 
that Barnewall has a duty to pay to $50 to Adolphus. The challenge, if we take rule-
deductivists at their word, is to come up with an argument that can plausibly be said to 
capture—to model—the justification of such a ruling (as a law-applying decision). As we 
have just seen, the legal syllogism cannot model that. So the question becomes this: What is 
it exactly that the legal syllogism can with minimal plausibility be said to model? In other 
words, how should we re-interpret the rule-deductivist’s thesis that there is something the 
legal syllogism can adequately model? We need first to answer that question—and then we 
need to ask whether that reinterpreted thesis is itself defensible. For if it isn’t, then no 




4. RULE-DEDUCTIVISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF PARTICULAR LEGAL 
CLAIMS 
 
I think we should charitably re-interpret rule-deductivism as the view that the legal syllogism 
suitably models the justification of particular legal claims—particular propositions of law—
when these are put forward on the basis that a certain legal rule applies to the relevant 
particular case. 
 To see this more clearly, take Gardner’s example again: 
 
Rule: Any person who calls another person a liar has a duty to pay $50 to that other person. 
 Fact: Barnewall (a person) called Adolphus (another person) a liar. 
 Ruling: Thus, Barnewall has a duty to pay $50 to Adolphus.62 
 
The conclusion of this inference is a particular legal claim—it is, more precisely, a 
proposition about the normative position of a particular person, Barnewall, vis-à-vis another 
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person, under existing law. And is the sort of proposition a judge would need to put forward, 
and be prepared to defend, as part of some more complex argument that would justify her 
ruling. According to how I now propose we understand rule-deductivism, then, what the legal 
syllogism adequately models is the justification of claims of that sort—propositions assigning 
some legal normative consequence or status to some particular case—when indeed they are 
made and justified on the basis that there is some existing rule that applies to the relevant 
case. In other words: when a judge properly justifies—argues for—a claim of that sort 
specifically on the basis that that is what some existing rule as applied to the case demands or 
warrants, her argument to that effect can be adequately reconstructed under the scheme of the 
legal syllogism.63 
 Does this revised version of rule-deductivism hold up to scrutiny? It is no longer open to 
the sort of logical objection presented in Section 3. But it fails for different reasons. Thus 
understood, the model of the syllogism is, I think, inadequate in even the easiest of easy 
cases, when there is no doubt that the relevant rule applies to the case in hand. Those are 
cases that the model only seems to capture well; the appearance is deceptive. But the 
problems with the model are more easily and effectively brought out if we look at an example 
of an actual judicial opinion that the rule-deductivist picture is clearly unable to capture. 
 
4.1. R v Luffe 
 
In R v Luffe (1807) 8 East 193, the defendant, one H. Luffe, was appealing against an order of 
filiation made by two Justices of the Peace judging him the father of a child conceived with a 
Mrs Mary Taylor, who was married to another man. The order of filiation had been made 
under the statute of 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1, which provided that: 
 
[I]f any single woman shall be delivered of a bastard child which shall be chargeable or likely to become 
chargeable to any parish [. . .], and shall, in an examination to be taken in writing, upon oath, before one or 
more Justices of the Peace [of that parish] charge any person with having gotten her with child; it shall and 
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may be made lawful to and for such Justice or Justices [. . .] to issue out his or their warrant or warrants for 
the immediate apprehending such person so charged [unless he gives security to indemnify the parish]. 
 
It was not disputed that this statutory provision gave “jurisdiction to magistrates to take 
examinations for making orders of filiation in case of bastards likely to become chargeable” 
to a parish.64 But the defendant argued that the provision concerned children of single 
women, and that his child “being the child of a married woman, the Justices of the Peace had 
no jurisdiction to make an order of filiation”.65 
The Court dismissed this objection. Lord Ellenborough CJ appealed to the “general 
purposes of the Act”—which were (as indicated in its Recital) “to provide for the securing 
and indemnifying parishes and other places from the great charges frequently arising from 
children begotten and born out of lawful matrimony”—and argued as follows: 
 
[W]hen the question is whether this were a child born out of lawful matrimony, that is, out of the limits 
and rights belonging to that state, it is the same in substance whether it be a bastard. It is so for the general 
purposes of the Act. The matrimony does not cover the child if it be in other respects (according to the rule 
of law applicable to this subject) a bastard. And so it seems that a child born by adulterous intercourse is as 
much within the provision of the Act of Geo. 2, as one which is born of a single woman.66 
 
There is no doubt that Lord Ellenborough CJ’s view was that the provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 
31, § 1 was applicable to the case of the defendant. Therefore, the court concluded, the 
Justices of the Peace did have jurisdiction to make the order of filiation in the case of the 
defendant. So can that argument be modelled on the scheme of the legal syllogism? 
What could the major premise be? Perhaps something like this—closely following the 
statutory language? 
 
(1)  For every x and every y: if x is a single woman delivered of a bastard child 
chargeable to a parish, and y is a man charged on oath with being the father of the 
child, then the Justices of the Peace of the parish have jurisdiction to make an order 
of filiation judging y to be the father of the child. 
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But then the argument could not run unless the court relied on the following statement: 
 
(2) Mary Taylor is a single woman delivered of a bastard child chargeable to a parish, 
and the defendant is a man charged on oath with being the father of the child. 
 
That was not, though, a statement on which the court based either its view that the statutory 
provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31 did apply to the case, or its conclusion on the point in issue. 
The statement in (2) was plainly false on the facts of the case, and the court did not suggest 
otherwise. In fact, the court made no effort to bring the case under the language of the statute. 
As far as the court was concerned, the relevant facts stood to be described by saying that: 
 
(2') Mary Taylor is a married woman delivered of a bastard child chargeable to a 
parish, and the defendant is a man charged on oath with being the father of the 
child. 
 
It does not, of course, follow from (1) and (2') that the Justices of the Peace have jurisdiction 
to make an order of filiation judging the defendant to be the father of the child. Yet that did 
not prevent the court from arguing that the statutory provision did apply to the facts. 
The court bypassed, as it were, the supposed antecedent of the statutory rule—whether 
formulated as in (1) or indeed in some other way—relying instead on a different sort of 
consideration:  the “general purposes” of the Act. What that means is that the court’s 
argument for the claim—the particular legal claim—that the Justices of the Peace did have 
jurisdiction to make the order of filiation with respect to the defendant cannot be 
reconstructed on the model of the syllogism. So rule-deductivism is wrong. 
 You may think this is too quick. What could rule-deductivists say in response? I see 
three possible lines of defence. 
 
4.2. Is Luffe Representative? 
 
First, rule-deductivists could try to dismiss Lord Ellenborough CJ’s remarks in R v Luffe as a 
poor example of the kind of argument with which they are concerned. Courts do not normally 
sidestep classificatory questions or apply statutory rules on the sole grounds that that would 
serve the “purposes” of the statute. Why think that the Luffe court was even purporting to 




perhaps even a legally deviant one—and to exclude it from the class of cases that rule-
deductivists aim to account for? 
The fact is that Luffe is a perfectly representative specimen. It is true that courts do not 
often apply statutory rules to cases not encompassed by the language of the statute. But it 
does not follow that when they do, they are acting impermissibly—or that they are not 
applying the relevant statutory rules. Moreover, my point is conceptual, not normative. My 
point is that Luffe is an example of a court appealing to considerations of a certain sort—
considerations of “purpose”—in order to justify its view that a statutory rule applies to a 
certain case. Whether courts were then, or are now, permitted to appeal to such 
considerations is, therefore, immaterial. Even in a legal system in which decisions such as 
Luffe were always impermissible, such decisions would still count, conceptually, as rule-
applying decisions. They would simply be examples of illegitimate ways of applying the law. 
It is, after all, a contingent matter whether considerations of purpose do feature among those 
that can permissibly be appealed to in any given jurisdiction; and rule-deductivists are 
concerned with providing a general jurisprudential account of the structure of the justification 
of legal claims on the basis of existing legal rules, rather than an account of some 
jurisdiction-specific set of permissible ways of applying or appealing to such rules. 
In any event, there is evidence that decisions of this sort, though comparatively rare, are 
generally regarded as legitimate in contemporary legal systems. Consider, for example, how 
another, more recent decision—the Queen’s Bench Division’s in Smith v Hughes [1960] 2 
All ER—has been described in a couple of recent texts: 
 
A classic illustration where the scope [of criminal liability] was expanded [relative to the literal scope of 
the provision] is that of Smith v Hughes where a prostitute was charged with “soliciting in a street for the 
purpose of prostitution” [which were the exact words of the relevant statutory provision, s. 1(1) of the 
Street Offences Act, 1959]. It was held that the offence was committed even where the woman was not in a 
street but was soliciting from a balcony above the street. The provision was obviously interpreted neither 
literally nor strictly, but according to the purpose of the Act, namely to remove the nuisance and offence of 
solicitation.67 
 
In [Smith v Hughes] the court did not use the plain, ordinary grammatical meaning of the words “in a street 
or public place”. Instead, the judges looked to see what the mischief the Act was aimed at.68 
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Smith is—literally—a textbook example of a court justifying its view on the applicability of a 
provision to a case by turning to considerations of statutory “purpose” (or “mischief”) rather 
than language. And Luffe, too, was reported at the time without any suggestion that there had 
been anything untoward about it; and described, rightly, as a decision on the application of 
the 6 Geo. 2. statutory provision: 
 
Upon the 18 Eliz. c. 3, which has the words “bastards begotten and born out of lawful matrimony”, and the 
6 Geo. II., which refers only to the case of a single woman, it was doubted whether these statutes applied if 
the mother was a married woman; but they were finally decided [in R v Luffe] to have that application.69 
 
Why should we care about how the Luffe court, or the Smith court, or any doctrinal 
commentators, viewed these decisions? Is it not possible for at least some courts and 
commentators to be mistaken about what counts as law-application? Or am I implying that if 
a court or a lawyer refers to some particular judicial decision as a decision on the application 
of a rule to a case, then that decision is an instance of a decision on the application of a rule 
to a case? That is not my suggestion. But the way in which courts and lawyers refer to their 
own activities does constitute good pre-theoretical evidence—not irrefutable evidence, but 
strong evidence nonetheless—for how we as theorists should regard such activities. It is, 
therefore, not open to rule-deductivists to shoo away counterexamples such as Luffe on the 
sole grounds that they do not fit their account—especially given that, as I noted in Section 
2.1, we would be hard-pressed to find in their writings any attempt to provide a clear 
characterisation of their own object of theorisation. 
In order to successfully dismiss such counterexamples, then, rule-deductivists would 
have to show not merely that opinions such as Lord Ellenborough CJ’s in Luffe are not 
examples of what they take—pre-theoretically—the relevant kind of claim or decision or 
argument to be, but also that such a restrictive understanding of their object would actually be 
justified. I do not think that rule-deductivists would want, upon reflection, to make even the 
first of these two points. But if they did, then I do not see that they would be able to defend 
the second. For although it is true that we should not just take courts and doctrinal 
commentators at their word no matter what, I cannot see what other considerations rule-
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deductivists could offer that would warrant the pre-theoretical exclusion of cases such as 
Luffe from the scope of their inquiry. Such cases may be infrequent in actual practice; but 
there is nothing theoretically atypical about them qua instances of decisions on the 
application of existing law to particular cases. 
 
4.3. A Different Major Premise? 
 
There is, though, a different reply that rule-deductivists—some of them, at least—might 
offer. I seem to be assuming, they might say, that rule-deductivism is committed to the idea 
that the formulation of the major premise in the legal syllogism should match, or at least track 
very closely, the text of the relevant statutory provision. But why assume that? Why think 
that formulation (1) above is the correct way of rendering the relevant rule? True, some rule-
deductivists do take the view—as I mentioned in Section 2—that legislated rules have fixed 
formulations to be found in the language of the relevant statute. This goes back to the point 
about separation of powers and about legislative authority and its role in the justification of 
law-applying decisions. Here, for example, is Neil MacCormick: 
 
That it is an essential consequence of appointment to judicial office that a judge must apply valid rules of 
law in exercising his jurisdiction indicates the interrelationship between adjudication and legislation—
because legislation is par excellence the process whereby valid rules of law are made . . .  
 I have said that “legislation is par excellence the process whereby valid rules of law are made”; that for 
two reasons. Legislation is unique as a source of law in that it yields what have been felicitously called [by 
Twining and Miers] “rules in fixed verbal form,” rules which have a single and uniquely authoritative 
formulation, their formulation in the ipsissima verba of the legislature . . .70 
 
These authors—a subset of those who endorse rule-deductivism—think that “the 
authoritative statement of an enacted rule remains static”71; that “legislation presents us with 
more or less ready-made norms” 72; that statutory rules are thereby “fixed and ascertained”.73 
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Such rule-deductivists will therefore find themselves in trouble when faced with decisions 
such as Luffe. But did I not also say in Section 2 that we should not think of rule-deductivism 
as being necessarily coupled with such strict and unduly reductive views on legislative 
authority, on the position of judges vis-à-vis lawmakers, and on the separation of powers? 
 Would it not be open to rule-deductivists, then, to point out, with regard to Luffe, that we 
should differentiate between the text of the provision, and the rule brought into existence by 
the valid enactment of a statute? And do courts not have to interpret statutory texts in order to 
grasp the rules they express? So why think that the court in Luffe was doing anything 
different? Why not say instead that what Lord Ellenborough CJ’s argument reveals is that he 
took the provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 to express a rule whose formulation does not 
track the statutory text verbatim? Which rule? Maybe one along the following lines: 
 
(1')  For every x and every y: if x is a woman delivered of a bastard child chargeable to 
a parish, and y is a man charged on oath with being the father of the child, then the 
Justices of the Peace of the parish have jurisdiction to make an order of filiation 
judging y to be the father of the child. 
 
Here the formulation of the antecedent—which, apart from the suppression of the adjective 
“single”, is the same as the antecedent of formulation (1) in Section 4.1 above—is one that 
the particular facts of the case did instantiate: Mary Taylor was indisputably a woman. 
Therefore, rule-deductivists might say, R v Luffe can be brought under the model of the 
syllogism after all. All we need is to take the court to have relied on a rule such as (1'), based 
on some suitable interpretation of the relevant statutory provision. 
 The problem for this reply is that that was plainly not what the Luffe court was doing. 
The point of the Luffe challenge is not that the court did not justify its law-applying decision 
on the basis of a rule—understood, along rule-deductivist lines, as a universal conditional—
that closely tracked the language of the statute. The point of the challenge is that the court did 
not justify its law-applying decision on the basis of any rule at all. 
 The Luffe court was concerned with one specific question: the question of whether the 
provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 applied to the case in hand. Now, in order to both form 
and justify its view on that matter, the court had no need to identify the full range of cases to 
which that provision would also apply. That, however, is what rule-deductivists would have 
to say the court had to be doing. For rule-deductivists presuppose that in order to reach a 




what the conditions are that would have to be met by any case to which the provision applies. 
That is precisely what the major premise of the legal syllogism is supposed to specify. All 
Lord Ellenborough CJ claimed, however, was that the provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 
applied to the particular case in hand—a case in which the defendant had been charged with 
conceiving a child with a woman married to someone else. Why should that require him to 
articulate—let alone rely on as a premise in his argument—a universal conditional spelling 
out the common properties of the cases to which that provision applies? Indeed, why think 
that a judge would even be capable of answering such a question if she tried?  
 It is not simply that courts do not, and cannot reasonably be expected to, offer watertight 
descriptions of the properties that will have to be met by any case to which the relevant 
statutory provision applies. They cannot even be reasonably expected to offer watertight 
descriptions of the relevant properties of the case in hand—the properties by virtue of which 
the relevant provision applies to it. So even if rule-deductivists were to further qualify their 
views by claiming that the major premise of the legal syllogism does not really have to be a 
statement of the relevant applicable rule—provided it is a statement of a rule implied by the 
statement of the applicable rule—theirs would remain an inadequate model of the relevant 
kind of argument. 
 Rule-deductivists might be tempted to object that I am overlooking a basic point about 
law-applying decisions: their universalisability. How can I suggest that Lord Ellenborough 
CJ’s decision that the provision applied to the case in hand did not bind him to any view 
about that provision’s applicability to any other cases? Is it not a requirement of formal 
justice that like cases be treated alike? Does that not imply that Lord Ellenborough CJ must 
have been committed to at least the view that all cases that are similar in all relevant respects 
to the case before him are cases to which the provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 applies? And 
does that not involve a commitment to the corresponding universal conditional?74 
 That may be so, but it misses my point. I did not say that Lord Ellenborough CJ’s 
decision was adopted on non-universalisable grounds. I did not deny that his decision—on 
whether the provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 applied to the case in hand—committed him, 
rationally, to the claim that every other case that is similar in all relevant respects to the case 
in hand is one to which that same provision would apply. My point is that his decision did not 
commit him to any precise and definitive view on what exactly those relevant respects 
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were.75 (What would the correct universal formulation be? That every case of a man charged 
with being the father of a child conceived with a woman married to another man was one to 
which the provision applies? Would this not be overinclusive? And how would we know? 
Some other formulation then?) 
 The court did not commit itself to any such universal. That is simply not how courts 
support their views on the application of statutory rules to particular cases.76 MacCormick 
writes that “one justifies particular implementations of the legal consequence [specified in a 
legal rule] by showing that the relevant operative facts do obtain in a particular case in 
hand”.77 This is, I think, exactly wrong. One does not show—or argue—that the relevant 
operative facts—MacCormick means fact-types, not tokens—obtain in a particular case. 
What one argues is that the facts—the fact-tokens—that obtain in a particular case are 
relevant. This is not to say that we have a good jurisprudential understanding of what such 
arguments look like. Whatever they look like, though, it is not the legal syllogism. 
 
4.4. A Different Minor Premise? 
 
There is, I suppose, a third reply that some rule-deductivists might offer to try to defuse the 
Luffe challenge. Rule-deductivists might choose to insist that there really is a major premise 
in Lord Ellenborough CJ’s argument, and that it actually does track the authoritative 
language of the statutory rule with its explicit reference to single women: 
 
(1)  For every x and every y: if x is a single woman delivered of a bastard child 
chargeable to a parish, and y is a man charged on oath with being the father of the 
child, then the Justices of the Peace of the parish have jurisdiction to make an order 
of filiation judging y to be the father of the child. 
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But they could maintain that the court did endorse, however implicitly, a minor premise of 
the relevant kind: 
 
(2) Mary Taylor is a single woman delivered of a bastard child chargeable to a parish, 
and H. Luffe is a man charged on oath with being the father of the child. 
 
The point would not be that the Luffe court took this to be established as a matter of fact; 
Mary Taylor was not in fact single. But given that the court nevertheless held the view that 
the statutory rule did apply to the case of Mary Taylor, it must have adopted the view that she 
counted as a single woman for the purpose of the rule. Luffe, then, rule-deductivists could 
point out, was just one of those cases in which the adoption by the judge of the minor premise 
is the product of some normatively driven classificatory decision. But the model of the 
syllogism is perfectly capable—as we saw in Section 2.5—of accommodating cases like that. 
We should therefore take the Luffe court to have been committed to something along the lines 
of 
 
 (2'') For every x: if x is a married woman delivered of a bastard child chargeable to a 
parish, then x is a single woman delivered of a bastard child chargeable to a parish, 
 
which, together with the (factually true78) claim that 
 
 (2') Mary Taylor is a married woman delivered of a bastard child chargeable to a parish, 
and the defendant is a man charged on oath with being the father of the child, 
  
deductively entails the claim in (2). Therefore, the rule-deductivist might say, the decision in 
Luffe can be reconstructed on the model of the syllogism after all. 
 The problem with this reply is that it is question-begging. It has no support in the 
decision itself. Lord Ellenborough CJ made no attempt, as I pointed out, to bring the facts of 
the case under the classificatory terms of the provision. It is, of course, how the argument 
would have to look like, and how we would have to interpret it, if the model of the syllogism 
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were, as rule-deductivists claim, a good one. But whether rule-deductivists are right is 
precisely what is at issue. 
 
4.5. In Summary 
 
What lessons should we glean from our discussion? There are two ways of interpreting the 
rule-deductivist view. On one reading, discussed in Section 3, rule-deductivists hold that the 
legal syllogism provides us with a suitable model of the justification of law-applying 
decisions. On another reading, discussed in this Section, what rule-deductivists hold is that 
the legal syllogism provides us with a suitable model of the justification of particular legal 
claims made on the basis that some existing legal rule applies to the relevant case. We saw 
that neither position is tenable. 
 Our discussion has therefore brought out that we need jurisprudential accounts of both 
those issues as a well as a clearer understanding of the relations between the two. It has also 
begun, I hope, to provide insight into some crucial distinctions that the rule-deductivist model 
either obscures or overlooks. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, as I said in Section 1, to 
address all of the many questions that these topics give rise to. Still, to conclude, I will offer a 
sketch—no more—of an alternative model of the justification of law-applying decisions, and 
a few programmatic thoughts on the work that lies ahead. 
 
 
5. WHAT SHOULD AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL LOOK LIKE? 
 
I want to pick up and briefly expand on some remarks I made in Section 3 on what it means 
to say that a court applied a statutory rule in a certain case. “Applying a rule” is a phrase that 
is often loosely used. Courts are just as likely to say they are applying a statutory rule as to 
say they are applying a statutory provision—an article or section, for example—or even 
several related provisions at once. Rule-deductivists, too—although they would probably 
maintain they are concerned with the application of statutory rules rather than provisions—
are not always consistent in how they use their terms, as some of the quotes above illustrate. 
And I myself have not taken much care so far to emphasise the distinction. But now—as the 
discussion in Section 4 will have made apparent—we need to be clearer. Unlike rule-




of the justification of law-applying decisions, our focus should be, I believe, on statutory 
provisions rather than rules. 
Applying a provision to a case is only one of two related notions that need clarification if 
we are to bring out the structure of the justification of law-applying decisions. The other is 
the notion of a provision’s applying to a case. Both are familiar notions, notions we normally 
use when talking about the law and judicial decisions. It is not easy, however, to explain 
exactly what each involves—and how they are related. 
Maybe we can start by noticing some immediately apparent differences between the two 
notions. To say that a given statutory provision applies—is applicable—to a case is, 
ostensibly, to say something about a relation between the provision and the relevant case. To 
say that a court applied a provision to a case, by contrast, is, as I pointed out in Section 3, to 
say something about what the court does. When we say that a court applied a statutory 
provision, part of what we mean is that the judge issued a certain decision. To issue a 
decision is to rule on an issue, and to rule on an issue is to perform a certain action: it is, for 
example, to convict a criminal defendant, to instruct one party to pay damages to the other, to 
allow the submission of additional evidence, and so on. Unless and until a judge has actually 
ruled on some issue before her, she has not applied any statute or provision. But when we say 
that the judge applied a certain provision, we also mean that the judge took and presented her 
decision as justified by reference to the relevant provision: that she believed her ruling to be 
in some sense warranted by—inter alia—the provision. That is what the judge will try to 
show in the part of her opinion in which she justifies—lays down the reasons for—her 
decision. Applying a statutory provision, then, involves two things: (a) the performance, by 
the court, of an action that (b) the court justifies by reference to the provision. What exactly 
does this justificatory link look like? What does it mean to justify an action “by reference” to 
a statutory provision? That is one of the things we need to clarify. 
As to how the two notions relate to each other, it seems plausible to say that when a 
judge faces a case to which a certain provision applies—when there is a statutory provision 
that is applicable to the case in hand—then the judge ought to apply the provision to the case. 
That means that the judge ought to perform whatever action counts as the action involved in 
applying the provision to the case in hand. This begins to capture, I think, one central feature 
of the role of a judge. It also suggests the following simple point, with which rule-
deductivists would, I believe, agree: in order to justify her decision—the decision she actually 




the case in hand is one to which the provision applies, and (b) that the issuance of that 
decision is the action that counts as applying the provision in the case in hand. 
I say rule-deductivists would agree—at least they should agree—because I think these 
two aspects of the justification of law-applying decisions are also what they are attempting to 
capture, whether or not they fully realise it. For them, as we know, to say that a provision 
applies—is applicable—to a case is to say that the case satisfies the antecedent of the rule 
that the provision expresses. We saw in Section 4 that this account cannot make sense of 
decisions such as R v Luffe, and one point I then made was that Lord Ellenborough CJ’s 
judgment that the case in hand was one to which the relevant provision applied was not 
justified by reference to anything even remotely like a wholly worked-out criterion for 
determining the full range of cases to which that provision applied. That is not a quirk of the 
Luffe judgment. It is a perfectly general feature of law-applying judicial decisions; Luffe just 
happens to be the type of case in which this feature becomes apparent. In cases in which the 
application of statutory provisions is at issue, what the court needs to tackle is the question of 
whether the relevant provision is applicable in the case in hand. “Is this statutory provision 
applicable in this case?”—that is the question, not “When is this statutory provision 
applicable?” 
If this is correct, we want our model of the justification of law-applying decisions to 
reflect it. And that means, I think, that we need to sever the ties forged by rule-deductivists 
between the justification of the claim that a statutory provision applies to a case, and the 
claim that the case satisfies the antecedent of the rule (or any rule) that the provision 
supposedly expresses. 
Here then is one first attempt at reconstructing the structure of the justification of law-
applying decisions. The point I just made—that when a judge is tasked with deciding a case 
and there is a valid statutory provision that applies to that case, the judge ought to decide the 
case by applying the provision—can be put in relatively more precise terms as follows: 
 
For every judge J, every case C, every provision P, and every action φ, if (a) J is tasked 
with deciding C, (b) P applies to C, and (c) φ-ing is what counts as applying P in C, then  
J ought to φ.79 
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My suggestion is that we model the justification of law-applying decisions as an argument 
that takes a conditional such as the one above as a premise, and whose remaining premises 
are simply the individual statements needed to instantiate its antecedent. Here is the structure 
of the inference (with small case letters used as individual constants): 
 
 (1) For every judge J, every case C, every provision P, and every action φ, if (a) J is 
tasked with deciding C, (b) P applies to C, and (c) φ-ing is the action that counts as 
applying P to C, then J ought to φ. 
 (2) Judge j is tasked with deciding case c. 
 (3) Provision p applies to case c. 
 (4) φ-ing is the action that counts as applying provision p to case c. 
 Therefore (from (1)-(4)), 
 (5) j ought to φ. 
 
There are two general points to highlight about this scheme. The first is that it is still, of 
course, the scheme of a deductively valid inference. As I said in Section 1, my objection to 
rule-deductivism has nothing to do with the fact that its endorsers propose to represent the 
justification of law-applying decisions in the form of a deductive argument; it has to do with 
the fact that they think that the argument should incorporate, as a premise, a statement of the 
rule that the court is supposedly applying. 
Indeed, the scheme makes clear—and this is the second, more important point—that 
premise (3) is a second-order statement about some statutory provision and its relation to a 
case. Premise (3) mentions, rather than states, the relevant provision (or any rule that the 
provision is taken to express). What premise (3) states is that the provision applies to the case 
in hand. Rule-deductivists, by contrast, seem to want to cash out in first-order terms the 
second-order idea that a statutory rule applies to a case. But how could that be right? If the 
justification of the court’s decision—the justification of the court’s applying a provision to 
the case in hand—turned, as rule-deductivists claim, on the fact that the case satisfies the 
antecedent of the corresponding statutory rule, then what we would need as a premise in the 
argument would be the second-order statement that the antecedent of the rule is satisfied by 
the case—not a statement of the relevant rule together with a statement of facts that satisfy its 
antecedent. Conversely, an argument that featured a first-order statement of the relevant rule 
as a premise, and combined it, as in the rule-deductivists’ legal syllogism, with a description 




that the rule applies to the facts. The rule-deductivist’s legal syllogism, in other words, is 
incapable of justifying a statement such as (3). 
What of the justification of a particular first-order claim in law on the basis that there is 
some provision that applies to the facts of the case in hand? The same thought applies. For 
convenience, take the Luffe case yet again. It seems plausible to say that the court justified 
the relevant first-order claim—the claim that the Justices of the Peace had jurisdiction to 
make an order of filiation regarding the defendant—on the basis of the second-order claim 
that the provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 applied to the case of the defendant. But then what 
that suggests is that we reconstruct the relevant argument along the following lines: 
 
(i)  If the provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 applies to the case of the defendant, then 
the Justices of the Peace of the parish have jurisdiction to make an order of filiation 
judging the defendant to be the father of the child. 
(ii) The provision in 6 Geo. 2. Cap. 31, § 1 applies to the case of the defendant. 
Therefore (from (i) and (ii)), 
(iii) The Justices of the Peace of the parish have jurisdiction to make an order of 
filiation judging the defendant to be the father of the child. 
 
Here too the point is that content of the the relevant premise—premise (ii)—is an 
applicability claim: a second-order claim about the applicability of the provision to the case 





Let me finish by stressing that the schemes just offered are meant as only a first attempt at 
clarifying the structure of the relevant inferences. My primary goal in this chapter has been to 
take issue with the rule-deductivist model of the legal syllogism. That task is completed. But 
there is much work still to be done on these issues, and it is likely that my proposed schemes 
will have to be refined as a result. For one, the mere adoption of these schemes leaves open 
the question of how best to understand and justify statements that a provision applies to a 
certain case. The very notion of a case, indeed, is far from easy to explain—it is probably 
multiply ambiguous—and stands in need of clarification. We also need a better account of the 




And we need an account of both the meaning and the form of general statements of legal 
“rules” of the sort that lawyers commonly offer, given that we have reason to resist 
understanding such statements as universal conditionals. This chapter’s connection to the 
driving theme of this volume is therefore less direct than that of other pieces here included. It 
tries to clear some ground for future work on a range of metatheoretical topics; but the 
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